Tag Archives: Credit expansion

What sense do we make of bad news?

It seems to be the season of bad news. Here, here, here, here and here with some honourable exceptions here and here, various sectors of industry led by the automobile sector seem to be facing slow or negative growth in the last financial year. What sense do we make of these disparate bits of data coming from different corners of the market?

Why are auto sales falling?

Before answering this question, it is important to understand that what we are witnessing is a broadbased fall in sales across the automobile industry, not just in one or two firms. This means that people have, in general, chosen not to buy new automobiles, which in turn means that they have chosen to retain their existing mode of transportation, which could be private or public transportation.

Second, a significant proportion of automobile purchases (2 and 4 wheelers) in India happens with a bank financing the purchase, usually paying a large chunk (70-80%) of the price. The buyer of the automobile pays for it on a 3-5 year EMI schedule. That people are not ready to borrow in order to finance automobile purchases indicates that either funding is not available as easily as before or has become too costly, or the borrowers perceive greater uncertainty regarding their future income and are therefore reluctant to take up the responsibility of paying for a new vehicle under a scheme of EMIs.

So, if automobile sales are indeed falling, it must be a combination of these factors
1. People choosing to retain existing modes of transportation
2. Funding not as easily available as before
3. People not ready to borrow now and pay EMI later due to fundamental uncertainty over their own income
that underlies the problem. But then that raises the further question of why such an outcome should occur, that too across the entire automobile industry after so many years of spectacular, non-stop growth? The answer lies not in an analysis of the automobile industry and its markets but in understanding the broader economic climate in which the auto industry currently operates.

The economic climate

Since 2007, the global economy and the Indian economy along with it have been muddling through what is today called The Great Recession and is being recognised as one of the longest periods of economic growth challenges since the Great Depression. On paper, the recession started in December of 2007 and while there are debates about the official end date, the problems that started in 2007 are far from over. Every now and then, a new crisis pops up and there is a mad scramble to contain it. It was Greece a few months ago and it is Cyprus now. Heaven knows what it will be in the near and distant future.

Like any depression, The Great Recession is just a period of correction that consists of identification of a cluster of entrepreneurial error. In simple terms, a large number of businesses suddenly and surprisingly find that they are and have been producing things that people do not need and are therefore staring at deep losses and capital erosion. As Austrian Business Cycle Theory explains, this cluster of errors is created during the preceding inflationary boom (in this case by the boom of 2001-2007) and is caused by a combination of misleading interest rate signals given to producers, credit injection into the production system and monetary inflation, causing intertemporal discoordination, i.e., a mismatch between consumers’ consumption decisions and producers’ corresponding production decisions.

That producers en masse suddenly find far fewer takers for their goods, as automobile manufacturers currently do, is a result of this intertemporal discoordination. When this happens, what a sensible producer should do is to understand the economic climate, try to develop a better forecast of what the future, medium and long-term, is likely to look like and adjust production decisions accordingly. This could mean, in some cases, producing less of the good. It could even mean completely ending certain lines of production, i.e., shutting down certain businesses.

Such decisions are usually accompanied by a lot of pain as many people are put out of employment and, in many cases, will need to reskill themselves to the requirements of the new production structure. This puts further strain on many already struggling businesses leading to more business failures and more people being out of unemployment. While this sounds painful, it is just the market’s way of clearing past production decisions that are not in line with consumer preferences.

This process goes on till the market clears out all such poor decisions and leaves the production system in sync with consumer preferences. Capital is taken out of the hands of those who made poor forecasts of the future into the hands of better forecasters, i.e., from failed entrepreneurs to successful entrepreneurs. This is the proper point of economic recovery. Further economic expansion would, under a free market, be triggered by fresh decisions to save and add to the capital available to be advanced for production for a more distant future.

An alternative, equally or more likely in today’s FRB system, is that the banking system interrupts the market’s cleaning up process and initiates a fresh round of interest rate depression through credit expansion and monetary inflation, thus flooding the market with cheap money and cheap loans. This time, however, one would also have to contend with the possibility that such measures are not guaranteed to work like they have in the past. Experiments in the Western world indicate that such attempts have not really led to an economic recovery this time round.

Summary

What the auto industry is going through today could very well be one of the manifestations of the bursting of the bubble created from 2001 to 2007. If people are not buying as many cars as they are producing, it is probably because they do not wish to see producers produce as many cars as they are producing. It is possible that the market is crying for a correction and that producers need to cut-back production to the level customers are ready to support. This is clearly one of the possibilities for any producer. Alternately, producers could place their bets on the RBI, through the banking system, inflating a new bubble through a fresh round of credit expansion and monetary inflation. In this case, they need to hold their horses for the recovery to happen while being prepared to profit the most by being at the vanguard of the recovery.

Clearly, therefore, each entrepreneur will have to decide which scenario is likely to play out and what is the most appropriate course of action for him. It’s not easy, but no one ever said that operating a business in an environment of uncertainty created by endless meddling in the market would be easy. The times sure are challenging and let’s hope many entrepreneurs do make their way heroically through this economic fog to do what they do best – meet customer needs in the best possible way.

What we need to take home, and what this article seeks to emphasise, is the point that in many circumstances, having sound economic understanding can help us understand business situations far better than those economically uninformed or ill-informed can. We can also see that cutting through the fog and making sense of complex situations is made possible by a good grasp of sound economic principles. The situation created by falling sales of the automobile industry in India only highlights the point that learning sound economics is a critical prerequisite for any aspiring business manager seeking to create a career out of making effective business decisions in a complex economic environment.

Understanding the impact of RBI’s Repo and Reverse Repo Rate Cut

It has happened as expected. RBI has announced a 25 basis point cut in the Repo and Reverse Repo rates. For the less exposed, this means that the Repo Rate has fallen from 7.75% to 7.5% while Reverse Repo Rate has fallen from 6.75% to 6.5%. What does this mean to different people? The segments we cover in this article are Banks, Industry, ordinary people and the broader economy.

Impact on Banks

To understand the impact of a cut in Repo and Reverse Repo Rates on banks, it is important to understand the role they play in banking. Repo and Reverse Repo are basically instruments used by the RBI to influence the total monetary base of banks.

To get a grip on this, it is important to understand how banks work and what the term monetary base means. Banks engage in a practice called Fractional Reserve Banking (FRB). As explained in the linked article, under FRB, a bank lends many multiples of the actual cash in hand. This cash they have is what I mean by monetary base. Clearly, any addition to the monetary base adds to the bank’s ability to make loans by creating money from nothing (as explained in the linked article).

In India, banks’ monetary base takes 2 forms – CRR (Cash Reserve Ratio) and SLR (Statutory Liquidity Ratio). CRR is the amount of actual cash that banks need to hold with the RBI. SLR refers to the amount (by value) of approved securities (government bonds, gold and approved, privately issued financial instruments) that banks are mandated to hold. Currently, CRR is 4% and SLR is 23%. Together, they constitute the monetary base of the Indian banking system.

However, what CRR and SLR do not cover is the extent to which the RBI can lend to banks. That is covered under the Repo and Reverse Repo. In a Repo or a repurchase agreement, the Repo seller (the bank) sells an approved security to the RBI with the understanding that at a certain date in the future, the bank will buy the security back from the RBI. The bank gets cash and the RBI the security.

One would expect that this would not influence the monetary base because while the bank gets cash and adds to its CRR base, it loses possession of the security and falls behind on its SLR base and can therefore not lend more. The interesting part is that this problem in the way of expanding bank lending is eliminated by the way the Repo system works.

Very interestingly, during the term of the Repo, the bank is allowed to count the security thus sold to the RBI as part of its investments to fulfil the SLR requirement. So, the net effect of a Repo transaction is an addition to the bank’s cash reserves without falling behind on SLR requirements. With this, the bank can now engage in much more lending.

At the end of the term of a Repo, the bank buys the security back from the RBI at a price higher than the original sale price. The difference expressed as a percentage of the original sale price is the Repo Rate. Thus, Repo Rate is used to calculate the price at which the security is bought back by the bank. It is the equivalent of an interest paid by the bank to RBI.

It might seem that at the time the bank buys the security back, its cash reserve falls. However, the bank can then enter into a fresh Repo transaction and sell the security back to the RBI, bringing the cash reserve back to the higher level. In this manner, Repo becomes a means for the RBI to maintain a steady level of lending to banks.

But all this additional lending would mean more purchases of securities to meet SLR requirements. This would mean the need to deploy cash for the same. That cash would go outside the system of lending and reduce the system’s lending potential. This problem is solved by what is called the Reverse Repo.

In a Reverse Repo, the RBI sells an approved security to the bank with the understanding that it will buy it back at a future date at a higher price. The difference between the 2 prices expressed as a percentage of the original selling price (per annum) is called the Reverse Repo Rate. The Reverse Repo Rate thus becomes the interest rate received by the bank for lending cash to the RBI.

The important point for us to note is that a bank may show securities bought from the RBI through the Reverse Repo window as part of its SLR commitments. Further, as in the case of the Repo, at the end of the term of the Reverse Repo, the bank can enter into a fresh Reverse Repo with the RBI.

Summarising the understanding

Bank XYZ hits its lending limit based on its CRR and SLR. It sees potential for more lending. It offers RBI a portion of the securities it holds as part of a Repo transaction and gets cash. It deploys 23% of this new cash to obtain securities under the Reverse Repo window from the RBI, thus keeping the cash within the system. The bank now gets to create new money amounting to 1/(CRR+SLR) times the money borrowed under the Repo window and lend it out at interest. The Repo window thus becomes a cheap source of borrowing for banks.

The impact of a cut in Repo and Reverse Repo Rates

A cut in Repo and Reverse Repo rates basically reduces the bank’s cost of borrowing from the RBI to add to its reserves. It enables banks to either increase the interest rate spread on loans made by the bank or offer borrowers lower rates of interest without eating into its own interest rate spread. Thus, a cut in Repo and Reverse Repo Rates increases the banking system’s potential by expanding more loans in a profitable manner.

Impact on Industry

With lower repo and reverse repo rates, industry gets to borrow more and even gets to pay lower interest rates on its borrowing. Therefore, those businesses that are in a position to secure additional lending from the banking system will benefit from lower repo and reverse repo rates.

Impact on ordinary people

The impact on ordinary people can be felt in 2 ways. In the nearer term, greater lending to businesses will lead to more business investment and employment opportunities. In the medium and longer term, however, the dominant factor influencing ordinary people will be the increased money supply (inflation), which will send prices of consumers’ goods soaring, resulting in future pressure to raise interest rates thus forcing the pricking of the inflationary bubble and the onset of the depression.

Impact on the broader economy

In the long-run, reducing Repo and Reverse Repo rates is harmful for the economy as it is just a means to lend reserves to banks, enabling them to engage in far bigger inflation to undertake much more credit expansion through FRB. While this lending will have some short-term positive effects, in the long-run, it creates and worsens the inflationary boom of the familiar boom-bust cycle. It also sets the conditions for the inevitable raising of interest rates thus pricking the inflationary bubble and triggering the depression.

Conclusion

Thus we see that the policy of reducing Repo and Reverse Repo rates is essentially bad for the economy in the long-run because it greatly aids the creation of the business cycle. It also hurts ordinary people by sending prices soaring. Industry and the banking system, however, benefit in the short run. This explains why a policy of lowering repo and reverse repo rates finds fairly broad-based support from the banking industry and general industry as well.

An economic depression is not a bad thing

Most people I speak to think that an economic depression is a problem that needs to be solved. Take a look at this article, for instance. This notion is far from correct. An economic depression is a period of necessary correction. An economic depression is necessarily and always preceded by an inflationary boom.

The real problem is the inflationary boom for which the bust is the cure

During the boom, policies targeted at interest rate depression allow the banking system to expand credit way beyond the available pool of real savings. This results in massive investments into projects that never would have been invested in on the free market. At the very least, new investments would need to be accompanied by
1. additional net saving by consumers
2. movement of capital from lines of production of other less preferred goods
These prevent the possibility of an inflationary boom. These conditions are a logical necessity for the new investment to happen.

However, an inflationary boom creates malinvestments. The process of creating the inflationary boom necessarily also includes the pins required to prick the bubble at some unexpected point in time. When this happens, the market reassesses all the investments made and sorts them into good and bad investments. This is done through the profit/loss mechanism and made explicit through the phenomenon of business bankruptcy. While this process involves pain, without it, the market cannot realign investments to be in line with consumer preferences, especially across time periods.

Economists would say that the boom causes intertemporal discoordination while the bust corrects those errors and brings about the highly necessary intertemporal coordination once again.

The free market is capable of keeping the inflationary boom in check

Even if the banking industry or a segment of it were to engage in fractional reserve banking by emitting far more paper, plastic and electronic forms of money than the real money commodity that they have on hand, the free market has a built-in mechanism to keep this under check. This is called bank failures.

Let us take, for instance, a region that uses dollars defined as a 1 ounce coin made of sterling silver as the unit of money. If a bank with $1 million in real dollars issues $10 million in paper dollars, the over-supply of paper dollars can easily be identified by the market. Further, the fact that on this market, every bank’s notes would be clearly identified with the bank (they would be printed as XYZ bank notes) and the market would easily be able to establish different rates of discounts for notes issued by different banks.

A more inflationary bank’s notes would be more deeply discounted than the notes of a less inflationary bank. Prices of goods might be quoted in dollars but one would have to fork out more $1 notes of an inflationary bank than the quoted dollar price. For instance, if an inflationary bank’s notes faced a discount of 50% on the market, a customer wishing to buy a good priced at $50 by paying in notes of the inflationary bank will need to fork out notes of $100 face value. If the discount were 75% because the bank is perceived as highly inflationary, he will need to fork out notes of $200 face value. Thus, the greater the inflationary condition that the market sees in a bank, the less valuable would be the money substitutes emitted by the bank.

Further, the more inflationary a bank is assessed to be, the more likely it is to be brought down by note and deposit holders walking into the bank’s branches and asking for real money in exchange. While this could be due to a loss of trust in the bank, it could also be because a trusting customer has issued a cheque to the customer of another bank that is asking the inflationary bank to pay in real dollars (which it does not have).

Such failures of fractional reserve banks would lead to a more cautious public wary of inflationary fractional reserve banks. Fractional reserve banks would then have to incentivise people to place money in their accounts, which in turn would raise the cost of their funds available for loans. In addition, being rated as a non-inflationary bank would make a bank more attractive to a public seeking greater safety of their money. In this process, the very service of getting rated on inflationary practices would become a valuable service that could be offered by rating agencies. Thus, we see that on the free-market, there exist many possibilities of mechanisms to keep fractional reserve banking in check.

If fractional reserve banking is in check, so is the inflationary boom. Thus, we see that an inflationary boom of the kind that we see today is impossible on the free market and that it is only fractional reserve banking with no market controls that causes the inflationary boom.

When we will encounter massive inflationary booms

Massive inflationary booms necessarily require massive interventions that prevent the functioning of market mechanisms. These typically take the form of government action aimed at protecting the inflationary segments of the banking industry. Today, these take the following forms
1. Central Banking with a monopoly on money issue and bank licensing
2. Central Banking as a source of lending of last resort to failing banks
3. Deposit insurance that is politically motivated and priced
4. Legal tender laws that force acceptance of inflated money substitutes at par
5. Capital gains taxes on alternate forms of money
In the absence of these forms of protection, it is impossible for a fractional reserve banking system to become as prevalent as it has become today.

The conclusion

We need to stop fearing or hating the economic depression. What we really need to be wary of is the inflationary boom that forces the pain of the bust on people at large. We also need to fear all the interventions that make the inflationary boom possible and the periodic pain of the depression a “necessary” feature of our lives.

How inflationary banking creates economic depressions and recessions

In response to my post of yesterday , a student of mine, Sankalp, had asked this question to which I responded thus. Sankalp raised an important point that I am sure a lot of people believe. With a little elaboration from my side, his question becomes this

What is the problem in banks being inflationary by nature if by engaging in such inflation, they will be able to lend much more and a lot more investment can happen? Would not an economy where lending is constrained by the actual amount of cash experience highly hampered growth in comparison?

Ordinary people see no problem in this state of affairs. Those with an exposure to mainstream economics would in fact jump to a fierce defence of this system and argue that growth would become highly constrained if the banking system were to allow cash to sit idle in the bank’s vaults while thousands of investment-worthy projects gather dust and go to rust.

The Austrian School of Economics in the tradition of Carl Menger, Böhm Bawerk, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek and Murray Rothbard takes a radically different view of this situation. Austrian School economists explain that the much dreaded economic depression (including its modern semantic avatars, the economic recession, slowdown, downturn or whatever you wish to call it) is caused by the inflationary banking system.

The explanation, known by the name Austrian Business Cycle Theory, originated in the work of Ludwig von Mises in his book, The Theory of Money and Credit (1912) and was further developed by his student, Friedrich Hayek, in his books Monetary Theory and the Trade Cycle and Prices and Production. In fact, Friedrich Hayek went on to win the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974 for his Business Cycle Theory, the only Austrian School economist to do so till date.

The brief version of Austrian Business Cycle Theory

In an earlier post, I had presented a stylised representation of a production system in which the original means of production, labour and land, are applied across various stages of production and eventually transformed into consumers’ goods. We saw in that case that the consumers’ goods output worth 100 oz was made possible and supported by a total capitalist saving of 318 oz.

What would happen if consumers were to decide to save 20 oz? Two things happen.
1. Consumption now falls to 80 oz
2. Capitalist savings go up to 338 oz
But what is the use of greater saving being available from capitalists when people have decided to consume less? The trick is to recognise that saving is a deferral of consumption, not permanent abstinence from consumption. In simpler terms, the saving is intended as future consumption. Saving is a decision to change the time of consumption.

This decision by consumers gets communicated to producers through a fall in the rate of interest. Producers take a cue and decide to rejig their production for a more distant future. In doing so, the production system becomes longer, with more stages of production. Hayek presented this in a highly stylised form using what are today known as Hayekian triangles as shown below.

Fig 1 - Hayekian Triangles representing the effect of new capitalist saving on the structure of production

Originally, a total saving of 160 oz churned out an output of 80 oz worth consumers’ goods. Now, a total saving of 180 oz churns out an output of 60 oz worth consumers’ goods. In our 6-stage production structure, a similar outcome would occur with a corresponding increase in the number of stages of production.

Many outcomes result. The immediate fall in demand for consumers’ goods leads to a fall in their prices. This is transmitted up the production structure, but the lower consumption does not put factors out of employment. The lower interest rate causes remoter stage capital goods prices to rise on account of much lower discounting (lower interest rates) of their imputed future contribution to revenue (called their discounted marginal value product). In the long run, greater availability of savings results in increased demand for factors in remoter stages of production.

The addition of stages implies greater specialisation and division of labour implying more efficient production thus leading to greater volume of consumers’ goods output in the future. This leads to a further fall in consumers’ goods prices in the future. However, when the greater output of consumers’ goods hit the market, the saved funds are now available to support their consumption. For the same 60 oz of spending, consumers get to consume the greater output of the longer and hence more efficient production system. This is the normal process by which an economy advances and standard of living improves.

Inflationary credit expansion and the production structure

When the banking system inflates money supply, it does so by injecting credit into the production system in the form of loans made to producers. This injection, however, takes place without saving by consumers. An injection of 80 oz of credit makes the production structure as long as in the earlier case with the 80 oz of consumers’ goods output being supported by a total apparent capitalist saving of 240 oz.

Fig 2 - Hayekian Triangles representing the effect of credit injection through monetary inflation on the structure of production

To achieve this credit expansion, the banking system will need to depress the interest rate. This lowered interest rate raises the prices of remoter stage capital goods as in the case of real savings, shifting factors of production there. However, the greater availability of capital without a fall in the demand for consumers’ goods results in a rise in the prices of factors of production. When the greater income is spent on consumers’ goods, their prices start going up as well, though after the prices of capital goods and their factors of production go up.

A general feeling of prosperity is created all around as capital goods prices, consumers’ goods prices, wages and rents go up and profits emerge in the economy. This is the inflationary boom like the one we experienced from 2001 to 2007.

However, inflationary pressures soon catch up and the system is forced to raise interest rates. Production processes that started in the reduced interest rate regime suddenly become impossible to continue further. To make matters worse, when the greater output of the more efficient, longer production structure hits the market, savings are not available to be spent on them. Unsold inventory piles up and businesses rack up huge losses.

The result is widespread business failure including failure of financial institutions that made loans to borrowers who end up defaulting. This is what we understand as the bust, commonly known as an economic depression or recession.

What we see

The lengthening of the production structure caused by genuine saving was stable and sustainable in the long run. Lengthening fuelled by credit expansion, however, is unstable as the manner in which it is done creates pressures that force an untimely increase in interest rates resulting in the depression stage of the business cycle. We see that once the inflationary boom is triggered by credit expansion through monetary inflation by the banking system, the bust is inevitable.

Thus, Austrian Business Cycle Theory helps us understand that it is the inflationary banking system that is the primary cause of all the misery created by the phenomenon of economic depressions. The key question now is

Are these boom-bust cycles inherent to the capitalist system of production or are they a result of intervention in the economy? Is it at all possible to eliminate the business cycle?

These important questions shall be the subject of another post on another day.